Hume (1711-1776) brought about a diversion from the intellectual mainstream and rejected the idea of a distinct stable self-concept, and instead emphasized upon the fluidity of “knowing self” and primacy of experience as a well-spring for a constantly cha...
In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers toknowledge of one’s own sensations, thoughts, beliefs, and othermental states. At least since Descartes, most philosophers havebelieved that our knowledge of our own mental states differs markedlyfrom our knowledge of the external world (where this includes ourknowledge of others’ thoughts). But there is little agreementabout what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge inother realms. Partially because of this disagreement, philosophershave endorsed competing accounts of how we acquireself-knowledge. These accounts have important consequences for a broadrange of philosophical issues, especially issues in epistemology andthe philosophy of mind.
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Fernández’s version of the transparency account avoidsthis worry about background beliefs, by taking self-knowledge to benon-inferential. He argues that a mental state, and a self-attributionof that state, can share a single basis. For example, seeing snowfalling will ordinarily result in the belief that it’s snowing;this visual experience may also form the basis for theself-attribution I believe that it’s snowing, accordingto Fernández. So a single state can serve as the basis for boththe belief that p and the belief that I believethat p.
1. What is self-discovery learning?
Evans’ remark concerns beliefs specifically. Mosttransparency theorists develop their accounts as explanations of howwe know our beliefs, and later expand these accounts to cover someother kinds of states. Within the class of transparency accounts,there are profoundly differing views about how self-knowledge isachieved and its epistemic status. Some transparency theorists holdthat the self-attributions generated by following Evans’procedure qualify as knowledge only because of our rationalagency relative to our attitudes—roughly, the fact thatbelieving, intending (etc.) are things we do, on the basis ofreasons. These agentialist accounts will be discussedin below.
In workplace professional development, self-discovery learning may…:
In this paper I will define the “self” in the writing concept and how this concept has been used in the book “Jordan, Mary Ellen 2005, Balanda: My Year in Arnhem Land'....
In personal improvement, self-discovery learning may…:
The strongest epistemic claims on behalf of self-knowledge areinfallibility and omniscience. One is infallible about one’s ownmental states if and only if (hereafter, “iff”)one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certainmental state. One is omniscient about one’s ownstates iff being in a mental state suffices for knowing thatone is in that state. (This omniscience thesis is sometimes expressedby saying that mental states are self-intimatingor self-presenting.) Contemporary philosophers generallydeny that we are infallible or omniscient about our mentalstates. Here is a simple counter-example to the claim ofinfallibility. Kate trusts her therapist’s insights into her ownpsychology, and so she believes him when he tells her that she resentsher mother. But the therapist is mistaken—Kate does not resenther mother. Hence, Kate has a false belief about her ownattitude. This case also undercuts the claim of omniscience, assumingthat Kate is unaware of her genuine (non-resentful) attitude towardsher mother.